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Abstract 
 
Decentralization of policy provision is omnipresent yet we are not able to sufficiently 
account for the extent of this phenomenon. The decentralization theorem explains the 
decentralization of policy provision as a trade–off between heterogeneous 
preferences, inter–jurisdictional spillovers (externalities) and economies of scale. 
Empirical tests of the theorem have been hampered by a measurement problem on the 
independent as well as on the dependent variable. This article tackles these problems 
by using a new dataset which combines a measure of externalities and scale effects of 
policies obtained from an expert survey with the actual provision of policies across 
governmental tiers in 40 countries. The analyses show that decentralization of policy 
provision is not solely determined by functional characteristics of policies but that 
heterogeneous preferences and other country specific variables such as democracy, 
economic development and European subsidies, also play a significant role. Hence, 
this article provides an empirical test of the decentralization theorem. 
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 Introduction 
 
Virtually no central government during modern history has provided and implemented 
policies on its own. Even the tiny states of Malta and Luxembourg have two levels of 
government.
1 In theory, multilevel government should be common, yet, few theories 
have been rigorously tested. The predominant approach is summarized by the 
‘decentralization theorem’ (Oates 1972; Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina and 
Spolaore 2003; Osterkamp and Eller 2003; Breuss and Eller 2004, Stegarescu 2005). 
This theorem states that the optimal degree of decentralization depends on the 
heterogeneity of preferences, on the one hand, and inter–jurisdictional spillovers 
(externalities) and economies of scale, on the other hand (Alesina and Spoalore 2003; 
Oates 1972 and 1999). An externality or spill–over arises when a decision produces 
costs or benefits to people other than those making the decision (Tullock 1969). Scale 
effects occur when additional units of a good or a service can be produced with 
relatively less input costs (Tullock 1969).  
The externalities and scale effects of most policies provided by government―e.g. 
health, education, economic development, spatial planning, environment and welfare 
services―are such that they require some degree of decentralization coupled with 
some centralized coordination (Shah 2006 and Ahmad, Hewitt, and Ruggiero 1997). 
Hence, multilevel government should be very common (see also Hooghe and Marks 
2001). However, clear recommendations for the practical assignment of policy tasks is 
hampered by tensions created by the trade–off between the realization of scale effects 
and the internalization of externalities, on the one hand, and the consideration of local 
preferences, on the other hand (Breuss and Eller 2004, 41). The normative 
                                                 
1 Andorra and San Marino have only one level of government, but the citizens in those states are 
(partly) reliant on policy provision by the French and Spanish, respectively the Italian governments. 
  2recommendation is further fettered by country–specific factors, such as politico–
economical variables, which should also be taken into account (Breuss and Eller 
2004). Therefore, to examine whether countries follow the normative considerations 
of the decentralization theorem requires an empirical and case–by–case analysis 
(Breuss and Eller 2004). Such an analysis, however, is complicated by measurement 
problems. First, the dependent variable―allocation of policy provision tasks over 
governmental tiers―is difficult to measure (Oates 1972; Page 1991; Treisman 2007, 
26–27). As Wallace Oates (1972, 196) and Edward Page (1991, 14) note, a direct 
measure requires a list of public goods provided by each level of government in each 
country. 
Second, empirical analysis requires measurement of externalities and scale effects 
but it is difficult to make unequivocal statements concerning which governmental tier 
should provide a policy. For example, Teresa Ter–Minassian (1997a) argues 
convincingly that primary education should be provided, at least partially, by local 
governments and that defense should be a national responsibility. However, to claim 
that primary education is (always) best provided by a jurisdiction with a population 
size of about 20,000 people is problematic. Even if one knows how preferences are 
distributed over jurisdictions it is still a very challenging task to determine which 
jurisdictional size optimizes internalization of externalities and scale effects. 
This article tackles both problems by using a new dataset which combines a 
measure on externalities and scale effects of policies obtained from an expert survey 
with the actual provision of policies by governmental tiers in 40 countries obtained 
from detailed country studies by the Council of Europe and Local Government and 
Public Reform Initiative. Empirical analysis of the dataset provides evidence that 
countries do indeed follow patterns predicted by the decentralization theorem. That is, 
  3the allocation of policy provision tasks over governmental tiers is indeed a result of 
externalities and scale effects associated with policies and local preferences. 
The article is organized as follows: the next section summarizes the hypotheses 
posed in the literature to explain jurisdictional policy provision. The subsequent 
section deals with the data, operationalization of the variables and methodological 
issues. Then the results are reported which are followed by concluding remarks. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
This section summarizes expectations concerning when to expect local, regional and 
national policy provision. According to the decentralization theorem externalities and 
scale effects associated with policies and local preferences should play a role but also 
other country–specific factors like politico–economical variables. Three country–
specific factors are discerned: level of democracy, economic welfare and European 
Union membership. The hypothesized causes of multilevel policy provision are 
subsequently dealt with. 
 
Externalities and scale effects 
The two most important characteristics of public goods are externalities and scale 
effects (Besley and Coate 2003, 2628). The optimal jurisdictional size from a 
functional perspective is the one which internalizes externalities and reaps benefits of 
scale. It is important to note that in this perspective each policy has its own optimal 
jurisdictional size.
2 Deviations from functionality arise when local preferences are 
                                                 
2 Another functional characteristic are scope effects/transactions costs which, however, are not policy 
specific. Scope effects arise when multiple policies are provided by the same governmental tier at 
lower relative costs compared when each policy is provided by different governmental tiers. This cost 
reduction is a result of reduced transaction costs and/or internalization of spillovers between policies. 
  4heterogeneous. Optimality in the perspective of the decentralization theorem concerns 
the trade–off between functionality and heterogeneous preferences. In this article, 
however, a measure of functional optimal jurisdictional size is used and deviations 
from this pattern will be explained by the hypotheses posited below. 
 
Local Preferences 
Different local preferences regarding public goods may lead to decentralized policy 
provision. Geographical diversity in tastes for public services can be especially 
expected when ethnic–cultural–language–regional identities differ (Oates 1972; 
Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Individuals with different ethnocultural traditions may 
desire heterogeneous mixes of public goods, such as education, welfare and economic 
policy (see for empirical evidence: Osterkamp and Eller 2003).  
Also, individuals sharing ethnocultural norms may desire self–rule on intrinsic 
grounds leading to a demand for decentralized policy provision (Duchacek 1970; Page 
and Goldsmith 1989; Keating 1998; Loughlin 2001). Autonomy demands are usually 
mediated by political mobilization, e.g. by regionalist parties which demand 
decentralization (Brancati 2005 and 2006; De Winter and Gomez–Reino Cachafeiro 
2002; Sharpe 1993; Urwin 1985; Rokkan 1999; Rokkan and Urwin 1983). It is 
therefore expected that―to the extent that ethnic/regional minorities are politically 
mobilized―the relationship between local preferences and decentralized policy 
provision strengthens.  
Decentralization might also result from differences in, for example, economic or 
ideological preferences. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) argue that democratization 
makes the political system more responsive to heterogeneous preferences. The authors 
                                                                                                                                            
Scope effects/ transaction costs may have great explanatory power with regard to the number and type 
of subnational tiers as it is more economically efficient and effective to establish two or three general–
purpose subnational tiers than several specific–purpose governmental tiers (Hooghe and Marks 2003).  
  5are indifferent regarding the source of heterogeneity of policy preferences which, 
thus, can have multiple roots. In order to test the argument made by Alesina and 
Spolaore, the model below introduces the variable general preferences which is 
measured by the Vanhanen index. This index consists of two components: 
competition and participation. Competition indicates the degree of power sharing 
among political parties (Vanhanen 2000, 253). The degree of participation indicates 
the extent of ‘the people’ taking part in politics, i.e. the extent of ‘direct democracy’ 
(Vanhanen 2000, 253). When all power is in the hands of one political party and 
hardly any people are eligible to vote, more central government concentration of 
policy provision is to be expected.  
 
Country–specific variables: democracy, economic development and 
European integration 
It is hypothesized that authoritarianism leads to deconcentrated rather than 
decentralized policy provision. Treisman (2007, 40–2) identifies two views of the link 
between authoritarian regimes and decentralization. The first is that authoritarian 
leaders impose whatever policy they like, limited only by functional and economical 
pressures. A second view sees authoritarian rulers as constrained, although in different 
ways than democratic politicians. An authoritarian regime also needs support of a 
substantial number of its citizens and one way to achieve this may be decentralizing 
policy provision according to local preferences. The result of both causal processes, 
however, is deconcentration rather than decentralization; that is, in authoritarian 
regimes policies are provided by central government agents rather than by locally 
elected politicians. 
  6It is expected that economically affluent countries make more use of decentralized 
policy provision than less developed countries. Some scholars note that economic 
development, not democracy per se, may explain the association between 
decentralization and democracy (Treisman 2002; Prud’homme 1995). Economic 
development might make decentralization of policy provision to subnational tiers 
affordable (Wheare 1963, 51; Oates 1972, 228–229). Another explanation is that it is 
only at relatively high levels of per capita income that decentralization is demanded 
by citizens in the sense that its benefits can be more fully exploited without the 
problems or disadvantages that tend to be more present in countries at lower levels of 
development (Bahl 1999; Bardhan 2002; Martinez–Vazquez and McNab 2003).  
A final hypothesized cause of decentralization is the process of European 
integration. Three causal paths are put forward. First, subnational tiers are likely to 
seek access to EU decision–making processes in those cases where EU policies cut 
across their domestic competence base (Jeffery 2000). This development might have 
led to a shift of decision–making power to the advantage of subnational tiers.  
Second, European integration leads to an increase in economic viability of regions 
which subsequently results in subnational mobilization. European integration removes 
large barriers to trade diminishing the economic advantage of large state size and, at 
the same time, increasing the prosperity of small countries and large regions (Alesina 
and Spolaore 2003; Marks and Hooghe 2000). Therefore, the decentralization demand 
of subnational actors is made more realistic and more politically influential by 
European integration (Jolly 2006 and 2007).  
A third hypothesized causal path concerns the instrument of EU–funding which is 
thought to enhance subnational mobilization as the EU distributes money directly to 
subnational governments (Jeffery 2000; Marks, Salk, Ray, Nielson 1996; Hooghe and 
  7Marks 2001). Furthermore, EU–funding pressures national governments to empower 
subnational authorities in EU cohesion policy (Brusis 2002; Hooghe 1996). 
Consequently, EU–subsidies might also lead to decentralized policy provision.  
 
Data, Operationalization and Method 
 
Expert survey and country studies 
To derive measures for functional characteristics of policies, I use an expert survey 
conducted by Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Arjan H. Schakel in which 36 policy 
experts indicate for 34 policies which jurisdiction should have a role in provision 
considering only scale effects and externalities (appendix A).
3 From the expert survey 
an externalities and scale effects variable for each tier is constructed and these are 
operationalized as the probability that an expert would place an X in that jurisdiction 
for a given policy. The variable externalities and scale effects measures the 
probability that tier A in country B has a role in the provision of policy C. As 
mentioned above, this variable is used as a measure of optimal jurisdictional size from 
a functional perspective. An example is given below.  
                                                 
3 The question remains whether the expert survey solves the conceptual problems of measuring 
externalities and scale effects. I do not know whether the expert survey sufficiently solves these 
problems simply because we do not have a ‘golden standard’ of how to measure functional/economic 
characteristics of policies. For example, Dear, Fincher and Curie (1977) used psychometric methods to 
measure intangible external effects as perceived by citizens of public programs such as locational 
decisions of a landfill or mental health facility. Another study (Weigher and Zerbst 1973) measured 
externalities of neighborhood parks by comparing house prices of houses adjacent to a park with 
houses one block away from the park to determine whether public provision of these parks is 
economically justified. Price differentials are often used to quantify externalities (e.g. Le Goffe 2000; 
Irwin and Bockstael 2001; Eshet, Baron, Shechter and Ayalon 2007) but these studies do not 
investigate the scale―in area and population size―in which externalities occur.  
Other studies which have looked at the optimal distribution of competencies across levels of 
government are in essence expert judgment themselves (Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht 2005; 
Breuss and Eller 2004). Two major advantages of the expert survey in this article are, first, that I use 
more expert judgments than previous attempts which allows me to assess reliability. Second, the design 
of the expert survey allows me to assess validity concerning structural error as well. In addition, Shah’s 
(1997) analysis is used to validate the expert survey (see appendix A). 
  8The expert survey data is matched with data on the actual policy provision by 
governmental tiers in 40 countries, i.e. 16 West–European, 15 Central and Eastern 
European and 9 Caucasian republics. This data is collected by combining country 
studies undertaken by the Council of Europe and The Local Government and Public 
Service Reform Initiative (appendix B). The country studies provide information on 
policy provision for 34 policies which coincide with the policies used in the expert 
survey. 
The country studies indicate whether a particular tier has a role in policy provision 
but the roles are not clearly specified in terms of depth and scope. First, the role of a 
tier may range from autonomous decision–making on policies to implementation 
according to strict central guidelines. Unfortunately, the country studies do not 
differentiate between regulation and executive powers. Second, the dependent 
variable does not provide information on the scope of the role either as it is not 
possible to discern the precise division of tasks between tiers. For example, when a 
policy is performed at the local as well as the regional level one does not know 
whether the division of tasks between these tiers is 30–70% or 70–30%, etc. What one 
can argue, however, is that when the national, regional and local tier co–provide the 
policy the country is more decentralized than in the case when the national 
government solely provides the policy.  
The dependent variable is operationalized as a multinomial variable to account for 
the fact that the extent of decentralization cannot be discerned. That is, the data may 
indicate that decentralization has taken place, but it does not allow me to discern with 
respect to the depth (decision–making versus implementation powers) or scope 
(finance, infrastructure, personnel, etc.) of decentralization. 
  9However, the operationalization of the dependent variable does not affect the 
empirical test of the decentralization theorem. The decentralization theorem states that 
policies should be adapted towards heterogeneous preferences and decentralization is 
an instrument to achieve this in an optimal manner. But the decentralization theorem 
does not say anything about the required depth or scope of decentralization. As 
Treisman notes (2007, 11) “an all–powerful central government, implementing 
[policies] via subordinate field agents, could achieve the same efficiencies”.  
In this article I am interested in the question when policy tasks are decentralized to 
tiers where heterogeneous preferences have or are likely to have influence on policy 
implementation. A centrally appointed executive, who is responsible to the national 
government only, can relatively easily neglect heterogeneous preferences. Therefore, I 
include only tiers where ‘voice’ is organized, that is, tiers with a parliament, assembly 
or council.
4  
Some countries combine deconcentration with self–governance at the same 
governmental tier either by creating separate administrations (Denmark, France, 
Norway, Romania, and Sweden) or by a centrally appointed executive head (Albania, 
Belgium, Lithuania, Poland, and the Netherlands). These governmental levels are 
included as some of these countries elect representatives in the executive of the 
deconcentrated state administration and/or the executive head is responsible to the 
                                                 
4 When policy provision is the responsibility of the national government it does not mean that the 
national government can or does not recognize, for example, heterogeneous preferences. The national 
government may decentralize policy provision via deconcentrated agencies which might adapt policies 
according to heterogeneous preferences as even with delegation there is some room for influencing 
policy implementation (see e.g. Lipsky 1983; Meyers and Vorsanger 2003; Scott 1997; Sowa and 
Coleman Selden 2003). Austria and Serbia (within Serbia and Montenegro) are examples of countries 
which make use of general–purpose deconcentrated state administrations without councils or 
assemblies.
  An appendix, available from the author upon request, shows whether the national 
government makes use of deconcentrated general–purpose agencies and/or other deconcentrated state 
agencies. It turns out that all countries make use of deconcentrated policy provision although in a 
different manner (i.e. via general purpose state administration and/or deconcentrated agencies arranged 
per ministry) and to a different extent. In this way, the influence of voice is not guaranteed and it is left 
to the head of the deconcentrated agency or a national ministry to recognize heterogeneous preferences 
in the decision how, where and when to provide the policy.  
  10council with respect to the deconcentrated tasks (Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden). In other countries the policy portfolio of the 
deconcentrated state administration is rather limited (France, Norway, Poland, and 
Romania). In Albania and Lithuania, the executive heads are centrally appointed but 
there is an advisory council present. The Caucasian republics make extensive use of 
centrally appointed executives which are under strict central government control. 
These subnational tiers are still included as long as there is an advisory council 
present. The model analyzed in this article introduces a variable which controls for the 
extent of democracy within a country. 
To summarize, the dependent variable indicates whether a particular tier or a 
combination of tiers, where ‘voice’ is organized, has a role in policy implementation. 
More details on the country studies are provided in appendix B. 
 
Data structure 
The process of matching the expert survey with the country study data is displayed in 
tables 1A and 1B. The first column of table 1A shows five jurisdictional sizes as used 
in the expert survey. The column ‘experts’ presents the probabilities that an expert 
will put an X in that jurisdiction for a given policy. The probability is taken as a proxy 
that the jurisdiction has a role in providing the policy when only externalities and 
scale effects are considered. The sum of probabilities over five jurisdictions is 1.  
[Tables 1A and 1B about here] 
The next columns represent the country data. For each local, regional and national 
tier of a country an average population size is calculated (data on population size is 
obtained from the country studies and www.statoids.com, last consulted on August 
20, 2007). A tier of a country is first classified into the jurisdictional scales used in the 
  11expert survey. Subsequently, it is determined whether this tier has a role in providing 
the policy. Finally, the outcome category is established which is matched to the 
probabilities from the expert survey. The resulting data structure is presented in table 
1B.  
To give an example, in country A, the national, the regional as well as the local 
tier provide the policy which results in the outcome category NRL. This outcome 
category constitutes the dependent variable while the probabilities from the expert 
survey are used as independent variables. For country A this means that the outcome 
category NRL is matched with probability National tier = 0.4; probability Regional 
tier = 0.2 and probability Local tier = 0.1. For country C this means that outcome 
category N is made dependent upon probability National tier = 0.2 and probability 
Local tier = 0.1. This is repeated for 40 countries and 34 policies.  
 
Controls: ceiling effect and multilevelness 
To analyze the data, it is necessary to control for two policy–specific functional 
characteristics. In this section I argue that one should control for country size and the 
‘multilevelness’ of policies. 
Country D exemplifies why one should correct for country size. The population 
size of country D is about one million and therefore probability National tier = 0.2. 
According to the experts―who only take externalities and scale effects into 
consideration―country D would do a better job when the policy is provided by a 
jurisdiction of about five million people. To conclude that country D deviates from 
the pattern predicted by externalities and scale effects would be incorrect. Country D 
cannot ‘push the policy up’ to larger jurisdictions and is therefore not able to provide 
the policy more efficiently. The best country D can do is to provide the policy through 
  12the national tier. As a consequence, more policies will be provided by the national tier 
of country D than the regional tiers in country A and country B despite the fact that 
they all have approximately the same population size. To correct for this, the variable 
ceiling effect is introduced and is operationalized as the sum of the probabilities 
assigned to the jurisdictions scales larger than the country. For country D this means a 
value of 0.6 for the ceiling effect. Country A scores 0.2 on the ceiling effect, whereas 
countries B and C score 0.0 (see table 1B). The variable ceiling effect varies over 
countries and policies. 
A second functional characteristic of policies is the ‘multilevelness’ of policies. So 
far I have assumed that each policy has its own optimal jurisdictional size. However, 
some policies, such as environmental protection and roads, are efficiently handled by 
multiple jurisdictions and experts place X’s at multiple jurisdictional scales. To 
correct for the degree of ‘multilevelness’, the variable multilevel is introduced into the 
model and this variable is operationalized as the total number of placed X’s by the 
experts per policy. This variable varies over policies only (see appendix A).  
 
Model 
Table 2 summarizes the operationalization of the independent variables introduced in 
the model. Appendix C provides statistical information on the independent variables.
5  
[Table 2 about here] 
Multinomial logit regression analysis is a suitable analytical technique as the 
outcome categories constitute a multinomial variable.
6 I n  t h i s  t y p e  o f  a n a l y s i s ,  
                                                 
5 From the Pearson correlation table in appendix C (table C2) one can see that the general preferences 
and polyarchy variables correlate highly (i.e. Pearson correlation > 0.77). Despite this multicolinearity, 
however, the results appear to be robust, i.e. the estimations do not significantly change when general 
preferences or polyarchy is excluded. 
6 A potential weakness of the multinomial model is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption. IIA means that the ratio of the categorical probabilities for two alternatives, A and B, is 
  13probabilities of policy provision by the different tiers and combinations of tiers can be 
calculated without making any assumption on the rank order or intervals of the 
different categories. Robust standard errors are used as policies are clustered within 
countries.
7 
 
Results 
 
The results of the multinomial logit regression analysis for twenty–six three–tier 
countries are given in table 3.
8 The national tier is taken as a base category and is 
compared to the six other outcome categories.  
[Table 3 about here] 
The functional variables have their hypothesized effect. An increase in the 
probability that the national tier provides a policy (probability National tier) coincides 
with a decrease in the probability that the regional or local tier, or the national tier in 
combination with the local or regional tier, provide the policy. The local tier gains a 
role in policy implementation, at the expense of the national tier, when probability 
Local tier increases. In smaller countries, the national tier gains role in policy 
provision whereas the regional and local tier combined loose role (ceiling effect). 
Finally, policies which should be provided by multiple tiers are indeed more often 
provided by combinations of tiers than by the national tier solely (multilevel).  
                                                                                                                                            
independent from all other alternatives in the categorical set (see Long 1997). I compute Hausmann and 
Small–Hsiao test statistics for both the three–tier and two–tier country dataset which suggests that the 
IIA assumption is not violated. 
7 Robust standard errors cannot be estimated while simultaneously correcting for clustering of policies 
within countries and countries within policies. The results reported are robust when policies clustered 
instead of country clustered robust standard errors are used. 
8 Here I examine three–tier countries, however, the results reported are robust when examined in a 
two–tier format (see appendix B). 
  14A remarkable finding in table 3 is that most other independent variables do not 
seem to have a significant effect. Though, those variables that do have a significant 
effect support the hypotheses. Ethnic fragmentation leads to more combined policy 
provision by the national plus regional or regional plus local tiers. Economic 
development leads to more policy implementation by the local and national tier 
whereas European subsidies lead to more role in policy provision for the national tier 
combined with the regional tier. These results might be interpreted as decentralization 
because these outcome categories gain role compared to the probability that the 
national tier solely provides a policy. However, we may also speak of decentralization 
when, for example, the regional and local tier combined gain role at the same time 
when the national, regional and local tier combined loose role. To investigate this 
possibility I need to change the base category: instead of using policy provision by the 
national tier solely I should use policy provision by the national + regional + local 
tier.  
As each outcome category may be compared to each other outcome category for 
all independent variables, the amount of the number of comparisons increases 
significantly (i.e. for the three–tier countries: 7 x 6 category outcome comparisons x 
12 independent variables). To enhance interpretation and reduce complexity, only the 
number and signs of the significant beta coefficients are given in table 4 and the size 
of beta–coefficients are left aside for the moment as these cannot be summed (Long 
1997).  
[Table 4 about here] 
The column ‘national tier’ shows the results when the national tier is the base 
category. The results presented in the row probability National tier in table 3 are 
summarized in one cell of table 4. An increase in the probability that the national tier 
  15provides a policy (probability National tier) coincides with a decrease in probability 
for five outcome categories (table 3). This means that the probability that the national 
tier solely implements a policy increases to the expense of the probabilities of five 
other outcome categories; hence the +5 in the first cell of table 4. This is repeated for 
each outcome category. In each row of table 4 the total number of ‘+’ and ‘–’ is equal. 
When a ‘+’ and ‘–’ are combined in one cell it means that an increase in the 
independent variable leads to a higher and a lower probability for the base category 
depending to which other outcome category one compares. 
By presenting the positive beta coefficients in bold, tendencies of policy provision 
across categories becomes apparent. A higher probability National tier, for example, 
leads to a gain in policy provision by the national tier only and a combination of the 
national, regional and local tiers. Conversely, a higher probability National tier leads 
to a reduced role in policy provision by the regional and local government alone and 
by the combinations national plus local and regional plus local tiers. Similar 
interpretations account for probability Regional tier and probability Local tier. For all 
three tiers, these probability variables have their hypothesized effect.  
The  ceiling effect leads to a higher probability that the national tier will be 
involved in policy provision whereas the regional and local tier combined obtain a 
lower probability. The multilevel variable has also its hypothesized effect as the 
probabilities of policy provision by the national, regional or local tier only decreases, 
whereas the probabilities of policy provision by combinations of tiers increases. 
The combined effect of ethnic fragmentation and the strength of the ethnoregional 
parties lead to a higher probability that the regional tier and, to a lesser extent, the 
local tier has a role in policy provision. Ethnic fragmentation leads to more policy 
provision by the regional tier alone or any combination in which the regional tier is 
  16part of. Political mobilization of ethnoregional minorities lead to higher probabilities 
of policy provision by the national and regional tier combined and the local tier in 
combination with the regional tier. Although the probabilities that the national tier and 
local tier will have a role in policy provision decreases when ethnic fragmentation 
increases, once the ethnoregional minorities are politically mobilized, the probability 
that national and local government gains a role in policy provision increases. Though, 
the gain for the national tier seems to be offset when preferences in general are 
politically mobilized. An increase in general preferences leads to a decrease in the 
probability of co–provision by the national plus regional and regional plus local tier 
and by a combination of all three tiers whereas the probability of policy provision by 
the local or regional tier only increases. In sum, however, heterogeneous preferences 
lead to decentralization of policy provision.  
The country–specific variables show centralizing and decentralizing trends. 
Contrary to expectations democracy leads to centralized policy provision as the local 
tier loose and the national tier gains role. Polyarchy increases policy provision by the 
national plus regional tier and leads to less policy provision by the local or regional 
tier only or by all three tiers combined.  
Development leads to decentralized policy provision as economic welfare 
decreases the probability that the national tier solely provides the policy and increases 
the probability that policies are co–provided by the national and local or all three tiers 
together. However, development also leads to less provision by the local tier solely 
which signifies some centralizing tendency.  
Finally, EU–membership seems to have no bearing at all on which governmental 
tiers provide the policy, but EU–subsidies  have. When a country receives EU–
subsidies, the probability that a policy is provided by a local tier decreases. The 
  17probability of policy provision by the local tier solely, by a combination of the 
national and local tier or by a combination of the regional and local tier decreases 
which is probably not offset by the increase in the probability of policy provision by 
all three tiers together. The regional and, to a lesser extent, the national tier seem to 
get a higher probability of being involved in policy provision as the increase in the 
probability that a combination of the national and regional tier and/or all three tiers 
co–providing the policy probably makes up for and more the loss in probability for 
the national tier only, a combination of the national and local tier and the combination 
of the regional and local tier. EU–subsidies have thus also a decentralizing and a 
centralizing effect.  
 
How may one explain the decentralizing and centralizing influence of the country–
specific variables? If one focus on the combined effect of the country–specific 
variables, one can see in table 4 that the probabilities that policies are implemented by 
tiers on their own decrease whereas the probabilities that a combination of tiers have a 
role in policy provision increase. The country–specific variables, apparently, do not 
have clear decentralizing or centralizing effects but they do lead to more multilevel 
government. Closer examination reveals that these variables pit the Caucasian 
republics and the eastern European countries
9 against the western European countries. 
The Caucasian republics and the eastern European countries are not a member of the 
EU (before 2002) and score significantly lower (p < 0.05; ANOVA) on democracy, 
economic development and general preferences but not on the other independent 
variables. The need for multilevel government may increase when citizens become 
                                                 
9 Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
  18more involved in politics and economies become more developed, interdependent and 
integrated.  
 
The results presented in table 4 shows that all independent variables, except EU–
membership, have a bearing on which governmental tier or combination of tiers 
provides a policy. To assess the contribution of the independent variables in 
explaining policy provision, table 5 presents the improvement of the model measured 
by two different pseudo–R
2’s. First, a model with the functional independent variables 
is estimated and each cluster of independent variables is subsequently introduced into 
the model. 
[Table 5 about here] 
From table 5 one can observe that most of the improvement can be ascribed to the 
functional and preference clusters of independent variables which account for 
approximately two–thirds and one–fourth, respectively, of the total improvement. The 
addition of the democracy, development and EU–integration variables do add some 
significant improvement of the model but the improvement is small. This seems to 
suggest that policy provision by governmental tiers is largely shaped by functional 
characteristics of policies and the presence of heterogeneous preferences. The results 
does not depend on the number of independent variables included per cluster as the 
results for the adjusted McFadden’s pseudo–R
2, which adjusts for the number of 
parameters in the model, corroborate the results for the Cox&Snell pseudo–R
2.  
In order to gauge which outcome categories are affected, changes in predicted 
probabilities are calculated. Shown in figure 1 are the changes in predicted 
probabilities for the seven outcome categories in the 26 three–tier countries when the 
independent variables of the preference cluster increase with one standard deviation 
  19while all other independent variables are held at their mean. Figure 1 displays the 
effects of preferences relating to identity (i.e. ethnic fragmentation and strength of 
ethnoregional parties) separately from those resulting from heterogeneity of general 
preferences (general preferences) as these variables affect outcome categories in 
different and opposing ways (see table 4).  
[figure 1 about here] 
From figure 1 the differential effect of identity and general heterogeneous 
preferences becomes clear. When ethnoregional minorities are present and become 
politically mobilized, the national and local tier loose role while the regional tier gains 
role in policy provision. The probability that policy provision by the national and 
local tier solely and in combination decreases while the probabilities for national plus 
regional tier and regional plus local tier increases. General preferences, however, 
increases the probability that the local tier solely provides the policy but the national 
and regional tier loose role as the probability that policies are provided by the national 
combined with the regional tier or all three tiers together decreases. All variables have 
their hypothesized decentralizing effect, but in case of identity the regional tier seems 
to gain role whereas for general preferences it is the local tier which gains role. 
 
How can one account for this differential effect? A closer examination on the data 
reveals an interesting pattern. General preferences is negatively correlated with ethnic 
fragmentation (Pearson r; –0.39; p < 0.05). If we look at the countries which score 
high on democratic openness but low on ethnic fragmentation we observe that the 
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) are pitted against 
the other countries. Indeed, Scandinavian countries score significantly higher on 
general preferences (36.7 versus 25.5) and lower on ethnic fragmentation (0.137 
  20versus 0.370) but not on the other independent variables (p < 0.05; ANOVA).
10 If we 
calculate the proportion of policies which are provided by the local tier solely out of 
total policies we find a striking average of 52% for the Scandinavian countries versus 
24% for the other countries (p < 0.05; ANOVA).  
A difference in ideological preferences between  countries may explain this 
finding. Political scientists often group the Scandinavian countries together with 
respect to the form of political organization and in terms of central–local relations. 
The vertical state structure of Scandinavian countries may be described as 
decentralized unitary countries with strong local autonomy (Page and Goldsmith 
1987; Loughlin 2001). The evolution of this state format might be explained by the 
growth of the welfare state. The scale effects and externalities of educational, social 
welfare and health policies are such that implementation needs to be decentralized 
(Ter–minassian 1997b) and as the Scandinavian countries have a long standing 
tradition of local democracy combined with social democratic hegemony during the 
last five decades (Huber and Stephens 2001), local governments have been 
strengthened at the same time as the welfare state was developed.  
 
Changes in predicted probabilities for the other three clusters (democracy, 
development and EU–integration) are also calculated but do not reach significance 
except for two outcome categories. A standard deviation increase in polyarchy leads 
to less policy provision by the regional and local tier combined (about –7.0%) and 
EU–integration leads to a lower probability that the local tier solely provides a policy 
(about –10.0%). These results corroborate the conclusion that policy provision is, by 
and large, a result of a trade–off between functionality and heterogeneous preferences.  
                                                 
10 The Scandinavian countries also score significantly higher on economic welfare but an increase of 
one standard deviation in economic welfare, while all other variables are held at their mean, has no 
significant effect. 
  21Concluding remarks 
 
This article shows that policy provision is determined by policy characteristics, on the 
one hand, and local preferences and country–specific factors, on the other. Countries 
seem to follow the recommendations of the decentralization theorem. Functional 
characteristics, preferences, democracy, European subsidies and economic welfare all 
have a bearing on which particular tier or combinations of tiers will provide a policy 
although the strength of these factors varies considerably. The real added value of this 
article, however, is to show that these effects hold while controlling for the other 
independent variables and thus providing a systematic empirical test of the 
decentralization theorem. 
The results show that heterogeneous preferences lead to decentralization of policy 
provision. First, a difference in ideological preferences between countries may explain 
the decentralization of policies to local governments in the Scandinavian countries. 
An increase in heterogeneity of general preferences leads to policy provision by the 
local tier. Second, heterogeneous preferences with respect to identity increase the 
probability that the regional tier is involved in providing policies whereas the 
probability for the national and local tier decreases. This means that, in the 
perspective of the national government, the presence of ethnoregional minorities and 
the political mobilization of these minorities, leads to decentralization of policy 
provision. However, from the viewpoint of local governments it means centralization 
(see also Toonen and Steen 2008).  
The other independent variables show centralizing and decentralizing results, but 
their overall effect is that the probability that policies are solely provided decreases 
whereas the probability that multiple tiers have a role in policy implementation 
  22increases. Democracy, economic development and European integration may lead to 
more multilevel government.  
The results exemplify that centralization and decentralization should be conceived 
as concentration, respectively, diffusion or sharing of authority rather than ‘closer to 
or away from the national government’ as it is normally understood (e.g. Oates 1972; 
Page and Goldsmith 1989; Treisman 2007; Watts 2008). Decentralization is better 
conceived as sharing of authority over multiple tiers whereas centralization should 
denote concentration of authority at a particular tier which scale might range from the 
local to the global.  
In my view, there are three interesting avenues for further empirical research on 
the decentralization theorem. As the dependent variable concerns tiers where ‘voice’ 
is present, it is useful to complement the dataset with data on policy provision by 
general purpose deconcentrated state agencies or deconcentrated state agencies 
arranged per ministry. 
Another promising line of research is to increase the number of policies and to 
investigate policy specific effects. Policies like defense and foreign relations are 
always provided by the national government, whereas other policies, like garbage 
collection, are most often provided by local governments. The externalities and scale 
effects of those policies are so intense that deviation from the functional optimal 
jurisdictional size is (very) costly. A policy specific hypothesis would then be that the 
probability for a policy to be decentralized is dependent upon the intensity of its 
externalities and scale effects or that social–cultural policies have a higher probability 
to be decentralized than other policies as it may be expected that ethnic minorities will 
prioritize having autonomy over these policies.  
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Finally, increasing the informative nature of the data deserves attention. The 
dependent variable used in this article is a simple dichotomous variable which varies 
over outcome categories. It is very difficult to tell what is behind the zeros or ones in 
terms of depth and scope. A one may range from autonomous decision–making on 
policies to implementation according to strict central guidelines. In terms of authority, 
these two possible situations constitute extremes. Also, it would be interesting to see 
when policies are shared, i.e. when multiple tiers score a one, to measure which tier is 
responsible for finance, personnel, redistribution, infrastructure, etc. 
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Figure 1. Change in predicted probabilities for policy provision by governmental tiers 
 
Notes: shown are changes in predicted probabilities and their 95% confidence interval 
(delta method) for policy provision by seven outcome categories when ethnic 
fragmentation and strength of ethnoregional parties (preferences: identity) and 
general preferences (preferences: general) increase with one standard deviation while 
all other variables are held at their mean.  
 
* p < 0.05 (one–tailed) 
** p < 0.05 (two–tailed) 
 
The changes in predicted probabilities are based upon the following multinomial 
model: 
Pr(outcome category)  =   β(probability National tier) + β(probability Regional 
tier) +  
β(probability Local tier) + β(ceiling effect) + 
β(multilevel) + β(ethnic fragmentation) + β(strength of 
ethnoregional parties) + β(democratic openness) + 
β(polyarchy) + β(economic welfare) + β(EU–
membership) + β(EU–subsidies) + constant 
 
Overall model parameters:  
N = 853 country*policies (26 countries) 
Pseudo–likelihood = –1168.21 
McFadden pseudo–R
2: 22.0% 
Cox&Snell pseudo–R
2: 53.8% 
 
See table 2 for the operationalization of the independent variables and table C1 for 
descriptive statistics. Estimates are obtained with the prvalue command in Stata.  
 
 
  29Table 1A. Matching of the expert survey and country study data 
Jurisdictional 
size 
Experts  Country A  Country B  Country C  Country D 
< 20,000  0.1  Local tier: 1      Local tier: 1 
± 100,000  0.1    Local tier: 0  Local tier: 0  Regional tier: 
0 
± 1 million  0.2  Regional tier: 
1 
Regional tier: 
1 
 National  tier:  1 
± 5 million  0.4  National tier: 1       
± 10 million  0.2    National tier: 1  National tier: 
1 
 
Outcome category  NRL = 1  NR = 1  N = 1  NL = 1 
 
 
 
Table 1B. Resulting data structure of the combined expert survey and country study 
data 
Country Policy Outcome  Probability  tier  Ceiling  Multi-  Other 
independent 
   category  Local  Regional  National  effect level  variables  Æ 
A 1  NRL  0.1  0.2 0.4  0.2  74   
B 1 NR  0.1  0.2 0.2  0.0  74   
C 1  N  0.1  ― 0.2  0.0  74   
D 1 NL  0.1  0.1 0.2  0.6  74   
 
Notes: the experts indicate the probability that a tier of a given jurisdictional size 
should have a role in the provision of the policy considering only scale effects and 
externalities. Outcome category represent policy provision by the: N = national tier 
only; NR = National + Regional tier; NL = National + Local tier; NRL = National + 
Regional + Local tier. 
 
  30Table 2. Operationalization of the independent variables 
Variable Operationalization  Source 
Functional: externalities     
and scale effects    
Probability National tier  Probability that a tier should have a  Expert survey 
Probability Regional tier  role according to externalities and  (appendix A) 
Probability Local tier  scale effects   
Ceiling effect  Sum of the probabilities given by the   Expert survey 
  experts to jurisdictions which are    
  above the countries national tier   
Multilevel  Total number of placed X’s by the   Expert survey 
  experts per policy  (appendix A) 
Preferences    
Ethnic fragmentation  The probability that two randomly   Fearon (2003) and  
  selected individuals belong to a  Annett (2001) 
  different ethnic group
A  
Strength of ethnoregional  Percentage of seats for the regional/  Schakel (2008a) 
Parties  ethnic party in the lower chamber of  and the PARLINE  
 parliament
B database 
General preferences  Vanhanen overall index (Competition Vanhanen  (2000) 
 multiplied  by Participation)  
Controls    
Democracy    
Polyarchy  Combined Polity Score (Polity IV)  Marshall and  
  ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) Jaggers  (2004) 
 to  −10 (strongly autocratic)
C  
Development    
Economic welfare  Natural log GDP (real) per capita  Heston et al. (2006) 
European integration    
EU–membership Dichotomous  variable (1 = country   Dinan (2005) 
  was member of the EU before 1995)   
EU–subsidies  Average receipt of regional   Ederveen et al.  
  funds as fraction of GDP
D (2006) 
Notes: all scores refer to one year between 1996–2001 depending on the country. Descriptive 
statistics can be consulted in appendix C. 
A 36 country scores are taken from Fearon (2003) and scores for Iceland, Luxembourg and 
Malta are taken from Annett (2001). The Pearson correlation between both measures is 0.928 
(p < 0.01; N = 27 countries). 
B Using the criteria developed by Schakel (2008a) the Caucasian republics Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan do not have 
ethnoregional parties represented in national parliament (1995–2001). The PARLINE 
database of the Inter–Parliamentary Union (IPU) is available on: http://www.ipu.org/parline–
e/parlinesearch.asp (last accessed December 14, 2007). 
C The scores for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Malta and Luxembourg are assigned by the author. 
D Data refer the situation in 1995 as data for later years are not available. 
  31Table 3. Explaining policy provision 
Policy provision by the → Regional  Local National+  National+  Regional+ National+ 
Independent variables  tier tier  Regional  Local  Local  Regional+ 
↓     tier  tier  tier  Local  tier 
Functional         
Probability National tier  –0.63*  –0.65* –0.44 –0.37* –0.78* –0.31* 
Probability Regional tier –0.17 –0.15 0.39 –0.44* –0.50*  –0.12 
Probability Local tier  0.10  1.37* –0.42 0.9**  0.83*  0.65* 
Ceiling effect  –0.48  –0.30 –0.14 –0.28 –0.87** –0.44 
Multilevel 0.61*  0.62*  0.67* 1.31* 1.09*  1.36* 
Preferences         
Ethnic fragmentation  1.64  0.00 0.81* –0.30 0.95*  0.45 
Strength of ethnoregional 
parties  –0.57 –0.10 0.09  0.20  0.17  –0.08 
General preferences  1.48  0.46  –0.63  –0.29 0.05 –0.42 
Country specific         
Democracy            
Polyarchy –0.73  –0.19  0.43  0.07  –0.55  0.04 
Development         
Economic welfare  0.35  0.18 0.38 0.44* 0.64  0.64 
EU–integration         
EU–membership 0.49  –0.35 –0.20  0.09  –0.03  –0.17 
EU–subsidies –28.4  –0.26  0.41*  –0.03  –0.47  0.25 
Constant  –7.13 –1.77 –0.56 0.83*  1.40*  1.74* 
Notes: Results of a multinomial logit analysis with the national tier as a base category. 
The table displays beta coefficients. All independent variables are standardized. 
 
* p < 0.05 
 
Overall model parameters:  
N = 853 country*policies (26 countries) 
Pseudo–likelihood = –1168.21 
McFadden pseudo–R
2: 22.0% 
Cox&Snell pseudo–R
2: 53.8% 
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Table 4. Explaining policy provision: number and sign of significant beta coefficients 
Policy provision by the→  National  Regional Local National+ National+ Regional+ National+ 
Independent variables  tier  tier  tier  Regional  Local  Local  Regional+ 
↓       tier  tier  tier  Local  tier 
Functional             
Probability National tier  +5  –1 –2 ―  ―1 –2  +2/–1 
Probability Regional tier  +2  ―  +1/–
1 
+3  –2 –4 +1/ 
Probability Local tier  –4  –4  +5  –4  +3 +3/–1 +3/–1 
Ceiling effect  +1  ―  +1 +1   –4  +1 
Multilevel –6  +1/–3  +1/–
3 
+1/–2 +4 +3/–1  +5 
Preferences             
Ethnic fragmentation  –2  +2  –3  +3  –4  +3 +1 
Strength of ethnoregional 
parties 
― –2  ―  +1  ―  +1  ― 
General preferences  ―  +3 +2 –2  ―  ―1  –2 
Country specific            
Democracy            
Polyarchy  ― –1  –1  +3  ―  ―  –1 
Development            
Economic welfare  –1  ―  ―1  ―  +1  ―  +1 
EU–integration              
EU–membership  ―  ―  ―  ―  ―  ―  ― 
EU–subsidies –1  – –2 +4  –1  –2  +2 
Notes: the table displays the number of significant beta coefficients and their sign. 
Each column represents a run of the same multinomial model but with the outcome 
category in the column as a base category. Only beta coefficients which are 
significant at the 5% level (p < 0.05; clustered corrected standard errors) are included. 
Beta coefficients which are positive are shown in bold. Out of 504 comparisons (7 x 6 
category comparisons x 12 independent variables) 148 beta coefficients are found to 
be significant at the 5% level.  
 
Overall model parameters:  
N = 853 country*policies (26 countries) 
Pseudo–likelihood = ––1168.21 
McFadden pseudo–R
2: 22.0% 
Cox&Snell pseudo–R
2: 53.8% 
 
Full results can be obtained from the author. 
 
 Table 5. Explaining policy provision: pseudo–R
2 
Cluster Cox&Snell  pseudo–R2  ΔR2 McFadden  pseudo–R2adj.  ΔR2 
Functional  36.5  36.5 10.5 10.5 
Preferences 47.6  11.0  14.8 4.3 
Democracy 48.7    1.1  15.0  0.2 
Development 50.2    1.5  15.4  0.4 
EU integration  53.8   3.6  16.8  1.4 
Notes: shown are scores for two scalar measures of fit (pseudo–R
2) and the difference 
between the scores by addition of a cluster of independent variables to the 
multinomial model (from the top to the bottom of the table). The adjusted 
McFadden’s pseudo–R
2 adjusts for the number of parameters in the model. 
 
Clusters of independent variables: 
Functional     probability National tier, probability Regional tier, probability  
Local tier, ceiling effect and multilevel 
Preferences     ethnic fragmentation, strength of ethnoregional parties and  
    general preferences 
Democracy     polyarchy 
Development    economic welfare 
EU–integration   EU–membership and EU–subsidies 
 
See table 2 for the operationalization of the independent variables and table C1 for 
descriptive statistics. The estimates are based upon 853 country*policies (26 countries). 
 
2
2 ()
1
()
N LM
Cox Snell pseudoR
LM
α
β
⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ &= − ⎨⎬
⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
 
 
L(Mα) is the likelihood of the model with just the intercept; L(Mβ) is the likelihood for 
the model; N  is the total number of observations; 
 
2 ˆ ln ( )
1 ˆ ln ( )
adjusted
LM K
McFadden pseudoR
LM
β
α
−
=−  
ˆ( LM ) β is the estimated likelihood of the model including the independent variables; 
ˆ() L Mα  is the estimated likelihood of the mode with just the intercept; K is the 
number of predictors. 
 
ΔR
2  = difference in pseudo–R
2 when a cluster of hypotheses is added to the model.  
 
Estimates are obtained with the fitstat command in Stata.  
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Expert Survey
11 
 
The functional variables used in the analysis in this article are based upon an expert 
survey conducted in January–March 2006 by Hooghe, Marks and Schakel. The 
experts were obtained from the member list of the Organized Section Federalism and 
Intergovernmental Relations of the American Political Science Association and of the 
European Group of Public Administration. The section and EGPA organizes members 
with an interest in federalism, intergovernmental relations and state and local 
government. Thirty–six out of 120 experts (response rate 30%) were asked to evaluate 
the externalities and scale effects for 34 policies. All experts were academics at 
American (30) or European (6) universities.  
The 34 policies were taken from the country studies performed by the Council of 
Europe (1996–2000) and the Local Government and Public Reform Initiative 
(Horváth 2000; Kandeva 2001; Munteanu and Popa 2001) to establish congruence 
with the country policy provision dataset (see appendix B). The question wording for 
each of the 34 policies was as follows:  
 
“Please place yourself in the role of a public policy analyst and put an X in the boxes [jurisdiction] that 
best fit your evaluation of what levels of government are most efficient in providing the policy in 
question. We would like you to give your judgment abstracting from the particulars of any country (i.e. 
whether a policy is actually provided in a particular country). Also the question of which level of 
government funds the policy is a separate topic and should not affect your judgments in this survey. By 
efficiency, we refer to 1) economic externalities and 2) scale economies.” 
 
The question was followed by a definition of scale effects and economic 
externalities. 
 
“Economic externalities are the positive or negative economic effects of a policy for individuals in 
other jurisdictions. Efficient policy should encompass the people economically affected by the policy. 
For example, defense policy protects all those who live in a country, while street cleaning affects only 
those in a particular locality. 
 
Scale economies refer to the decreased cost of policy provision per unit as the scale of provision 
increases. Efficient policy should reap the available economies of scale for providing a policy. Defense 
policy is most efficient when a single army deters threats to all those who live in a country, while street 
cleaning can be efficiently organized at a local level.”          
 
The expert was allowed to put an X in five jurisdictions (boxes) with assigned 
population sizes (based upon average population sizes of the jurisdictions classified in 
the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) and Local Administrative 
Unit (LAU) used by the European Union): 
 
Local    <  20,000 
Local–Regional   ± 100,000 
Regional    ± 1 million 
Regional–National  ± 5 million 
National    > 10 million 
                                                 
11 The survey was pre–tested by Professor Deil Wright and by William Ewell at the University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill. The conductors are deeply grateful for their feedback on the survey. Professor 
Wright facilitated the distribution among APSA–federalism members; Professor G. Bouckaert arranged 
for the survey to be sent to EGPA members. 
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The experts were allowed to put an X in more than one jurisdiction to allow for the 
possibility that some policies are efficiently handled at multiple scales. A list of 
policies is provided in table A1. This table also provides the scores for the multilevel 
variable used in the analysis.  
 
Table A1. List of 34 policies used in the expert survey 
Policy Multilevel 
roads (including local roads to highways)  101 
transport (including rail transport, subways/metro, buses)  99 
environmental protection (including air, water, soil)  95 
health protection (e.g. disease prevention)  86 
water supply  83 
tourism promotion  83 
Museums 82 
sewage and water treatment  79 
public housing  78 
family welfare services (e.g. homeless shelters/families in crisis)  77 
secondary education  77 
parks and open spaces  76 
primary education  73 
vocational and technical education  73 
Electricity 71 
welfare homes (e.g. orphanages)  71 
sport and leisure facilities  71 
Libraries 70 
In–home services for the elderly and the handicapped  70 
voter registration  69 
theatre and concert facilities  69 
Hospitals 69 
Gas 68 
regional/spatial planning  68 
town planning  68 
refuse collection  66 
refuse disposal  65 
higher education  64 
pre–school education  62 
consumer protection  61 
nursery and kindergarten  59 
fire protection  58 
district heating (public distribution of  hot water)  53 
cemeteries and crematoria  47 
Notes: Multilevel is measured by the total number of placed X’s by all experts for a given policy; high 
values indicate that the policy should be provided by multiple governmental tiers when only 
externalities and scale effects are considered; low values indicate that a jurisdiction of a particular 
population size should provide the policy. 
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We use the Cronbach’s alpha
12 for each jurisdiction and all jurisdictions combined to 
measure reliability among expert evaluations. From table A2 one may conclude that 
the experts converge. 
 
Table A2. Cronbach’s alpha scores per jurisdiction 
 Local  Local–
Regional 
Regional Regional
–National 
National Overall 
Cronbach’s α  0.890 0.743 0.843 0.834 0.913 0.872 
Notes: results for 34 experts (two experts had to be excluded as they had too many missing data) over 
34 policies (listwise deletion).  
 
Structural error 
Two different versions of the expert survey were sent to the experts. Version A 
presented the 34 policies in the order as they appeared in the country studies 
mentioned above (N = 14). Version B presented the 34 policies in alphabetical order 
(N =22). The presence of systematic error due to the presentation of the list of policies 
can be gauged by comparing the answers of the experts for both versions of the expert 
survey. An one–way ANOVA analysis for each policy reveals that 9 out of 170 
possible comparisons (34 policies x 5 jurisdictions) are significantly different between 
the two versions (that is 5%). This leads to the conclusion that, overall, there are no 
significant differences between the two versions of the expert survey and that there is 
no systematic error due to the listing of the policies. 
Another structural bias may result from the fact that most consulted experts work 
at an university in the United States of America (the country, however, is not included 
in the analysis). It might be that their country experience (partly) framed their answers 
to the question which jurisdiction should provide a policy. We cannot discern whether 
this is the case but we may argue to what extent this has implications for the findings. 
The results are based upon differences between policy provision by tiers as functional 
theory would have it against actual policy provision in countries. If the experts used 
their country experience in their answers than the benchmark is biased and does not 
reflect optimal policy provision according to scale effects and externalities. Rather, 
the deviations refer to a difference in policy provision between the United States and 
another country. In spite of this, the conclusions remain the same; that is, when, for 
example, ethnic fragmentation rises it leads to a higher probability that the regional 
tier is involved in policy provision compared to the state level in the United States. 
The results, however, are either under– or overestimations compared to a functional 
                                                 
12 Other reliability measures appropriate for nominal data such as Cohen’s/Fleiss’ kappa and iota 
(Janson and Olsson 2001) can not be applied to the expert survey. First, the data suffer from the 
prevalence problem of zeros. If prevalence is high, chance agreement is also high and Cohen’s/Fleiss’ 
kappa and iota are reduced accordingly (Sim and Wright 2005). Prevalence adjusted kappa indices 
exist but Hoehler (2000) is critical of the use of the prevalence–adjusted–kappa because he believes 
that the effect of prevalence on the magnitude of kappa is itself informative and should not be adjusted 
for. Second, experts were allowed to place an X in more than one answer category. This fact violates 
the assumption of mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories underlying the iota and Cohen’s/Fleiss’ 
kappa. Third, one should weigh Cohen/Fleiss’ kappa and iota according to the degree of disagreement 
between experts but this is not possible for this expert survey due to the non–exclusiveness of 
categories. There are good theoretical reasons for non–exclusiveness because some policies are more 
efficiently and effectively provided when several governmental levels play a role in policy provision. 
  37benchmark. As the United States is a rather decentralized country, compared to the 
countries in our analysis, underestimation is more likely than overestimation.  
 
Funding of policies 
It is important to note that the experts were asked to discard the question which level 
of government should fund the policies (see question wording above). Spillovers 
benefits across jurisdictions arising from local policy provision “can be promoted by 
appropriate unit subsidies which might encourage decentralized authorities to extend 
outputs to efficient levels” (Oates 2005, 352). Internalizing externalities constitutes, 
therefore, not a necessary condition for optimal policy provision. The exclusion of the 
question which level of government should finance the policy or which level of 
government should have which tax powers (Oates 2005) does not need to concerns us 
as I am interested in explaining local and regional policy provision and not whether 
and how optimal levels of policy output are being reached. 
 
Validation 
The expert survey on externalities and scale effects of 34 policies is, to our 
knowledge, the first one of its kind. Therefore, it is difficult to validate the data. 
Alesina, Angeloni amd Schuknecht (2005) compare their normative assessment of the 
desirable allocation of policy responsibilities between the European Union and 
member states with public opinion data (Eurobarometer). Unfortunately, public 
opinion data on the desired allocation of policy provision tasks between national and 
subnational tiers for the countries included in this analysis do not exist. To tentatively 
validate the data I use Shah’s (1997) assessment on assigning responsibilities for local 
public services. Anwar Shah is an economist, coordinator of the public sector reform 
cluster at the World Bank and has advised many governments on fiscal federalism 
issues. For several policies he provides “a subjective assessment of how various 
allocative criteria favor either local or metropolitan assignment” (1997: 21). Shah uses 
economies of scale, economies of scope, benefit–cost spillout, political proximity and 
consumer sovereignty as allocative criteria which (partly) overlap with the criteria 
used by the experts during their assessment. Based on his evaluation Shah comes up 
with a categorization of policies: local public services that could be decentralization to 
(1) all local governments, (2) to larger urban municipalities and (3) to metropolitan or 
regional governments (1997: 22–24). What makes Shah’s analysis informative is that 
he gives approximate population sizes for larger urban municipalities and 
metropolitan or regional governments which coincide with the population size 
assigned to the jurisdictions Local–Regional (approx. 100,000 people) and Regional 
(approx. 1 million people) in the expert survey. 
In table A3 we compare Shah’s analysis with the expert survey for 19 policies. 
The first two columns give the policy labels as used by Shah and the expert survey. 
The next columns represent the proportion of experts which placed an X in that 
jurisdictional category (each expert is given a weight of one). Figures in bold indicate 
that a majority of experts agree with Shah whereas underlined figures indicate that a 
majority of experts places an X in another jurisdiction.  
As can be seen in table A3, the experts and Shah agree on the first five policies. A 
majority of the experts place an X in the local jurisdiction (< 20,000) for policies 
which, according to Shah, should be decentralized to all local governments. This is 
also the case for policies which could be decentralized to larger urban municipalities 
(population over 100,000). Most experts place an X in the jurisdiction Local–Regional 
(100,000) except for land use planning. However, in the latter case there is a 
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difference in label use between the expert survey and Shah which might indicate that 
they refer to different policies. Shah makes a distinction between ‘land use planning’ 
and ‘regional planning’ whereas the experts only assessed ‘regional and spatial 
planning’. 
There is also convergence between the experts and Shah for policies which, 
according to Shah, could be provided by metropolitan or regional governments 
(combined population of one million). Again, a difference in label use might explain 
disagreements. Shah use the labels ‘neighborhood parks and recreation’, ‘regional 
parks’, ‘local libraries’ and ‘special libraries’ whereas the experts were asked to 
evaluate ‘parks and open spaces’ and ‘libraries’ without further differentiation. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the experts are somewhat evenly divided over the 
three smallest jurisdictions (i.e. Local, Local–Regional and Regional) for these two 
policies. The difference in label use might also explain the disagreement between 
Shah and the experts for ‘public health’/‘health protection’. The experts and Shah also 
diverge in their judgment for ‘hospitals’ and ‘air and water pollution’/‘environmental 
protection’, though a second largest majority of the experts placed an X in a 
jurisdiction next to the preferred population size by Shah. Overall, Shah and the 
experts agree to a large extent and this we find comforting. 
 Table A3. Comparison between Shah (1997) and the expert survey on the question which jurisdiction should provide the policy for 19 policies. 
Jurisdictional sizes as used in the expert survey 
Local Local―Regional Regional Regional―National National  Policy label used 
by Shah (1997) 
Policy label used 
in the expert survey  < 20,000  ± 100,000  ± 1 million  ± 5 million  > 10 million 
Local public services that could be decentralized to all local governments according to Shah (1997) 
Fire protection  Fire protection  0.52  0.27 0.14  0.01  0.06 
Primary education  Primary education  0.34  0.36 0.14  0.09  0.07 
Refuse collection  Refuse collection  0.45  0.26 0.16  0.08  0.05 
Neighborhood parks and recreation  Parks and open spaces  0.39  0.26 0.25  0.06  0.04 
Local libraries  Libraries  0.29  0.29 0.28  0.07  0.06 
Local public services that could be decentralized to larger urban municipalities (population over 100,000) according to Shah (1997) 
Land use planning  Regional/spatial planning  0.05  0.24  0.40 0.24 0.07 
Secondary education  Secondary education  0.21  0.37  0.23 0.07 0.12 
Local public services to be provided by metropolitan or regional governments (combined population of one million) according to Shah (1997) 
Air and water pollution  Environmental protection   0.10  0.14  0.18  0.32 0.27 
Electric power  Electricity  0.12  0.17  0.37  0.22 0.13 
Gas Gas  0.19  0.20  0.31  0.16 0.14 
Hospitals Hospitals  0.07  0.39 0.24  0.21  0.09 
Public health  Health protection  0.09  0.16  0.19  0.22  0.34 
Refuse disposal  Refuse disposal  0.23  0.24  0.29  0.16 0.08 
Regional parks  Parks and open spaces  0.39 0.26  0.25  0.06  0.04 
Regional planning.  Regional/spatial planning  0.05  0.24  0.40  0.24 0.07 
Sewage disposal  Sewage and water treatment  0.19  0.29  0.32  0.13 0.07 
Special libraries  Libraries  0.29 0.29 0.28  0.07  0.06 
Transportation Transport  0.08  0.19  0.31  0.26 0.16 
Water supply  Water supply   0.22  0.22  0.30  0.17 0.09 
Notes: The figures represent the proportion of experts which placed an X in that jurisdictional category (each expert is given a weight of 1). 
Figures in bold represent agreement whereas underlined figures represent disagreement between Shah (1997) and a majority of the experts. 
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Country Data 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) has published 32 country studies on the structure and 
operation of local and regional democracy (Council of Europe 1996–2000). Twenty–
seven country studies contain a table which shows which tiers are competent for the 
provision of 47 policies. Representatives from the ministries in charge of local and 
regional government represented the country in the CDLR (The Steering Committee on 
Local and Regional Democracy of the Council of Europe) and they completed/filled in 
the tables (pers.comm. Montgomery). These tables also indicate the type of competence, 
i.e. whether the tier of government has exclusive, shared, compulsory, or discretionary 
competence, and the exercise of the competence (direct, indirect, in own right, of for 
another authority). Since the definitions may not have been consistently applied across 
countries (pers.comm. Montgomery), I have chosen not use this information.  
The Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) conducted country 
studies in Eastern and Central European Countries and in several former Russian 
Republics (Horváth 2000; Kandeva 2001; Munteanu and Popa 2001). The set–up of the 
country studies and the information contained within the country studies is broadly 
similar to that of the CoE. Twenty–three country studies present tables which score for 44 
policies whether a governmental tier has a role in policy provision. 
The country studies provide data on actual policy provision per tier for a total of 40 
countries (16 West European, 15 Central and Eastern European and 9 Caucasian 
republics) and 34 policies common to both surveys (see table A1). Ten countries are 
analyzed by both sources (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). To enhance comparability, the Council of 
Europe data for these ten countries are used since the CoE dataset is the source of most 
countries. The results presented in this article do not significantly change when data from 
the LGI country studies are used instead of the CoE data.
  
 
Three–tier versus two–tier countries 
The decision whether to decentralize policy provision is highly dependent on the number 
of subnational tiers. When a policy is best provided by a regional tier but a country has no 
regional tier, the government has to decide whether to provide the policy at the national 
or local level or to provide it at both levels. However, in a three–tier country the policy 
can be provided at the regional level. This means that the possible choices regarding 
which tiers should provide a policy differ in three–tier versus two–tier countries. In order 
to account for this, the dataset is split up in two databases. One database refers 14 two–
tier countries. These are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Iceland, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Turkey.  
The second database refers to 26 three–tier countries and these are: Albania, Austria, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Russian federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
  41Five of these three–tier countries have actually four governmental tiers (i.e. Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Spain, and Poland). There are several reasons why 
these countries are not analyzed separately. First, in these countries there are fifteen 
possible combinations of governmental tiers which may provide a policy (i.e. N, R1, R2, 
L, NR1, NR2, NL, R1R2, R1L, R2L, NR1R2L, NR1R2, NR1L, NR2L, R1R2L). Some of the 
categories are empty―that is, policy provision is never provided by a specific 
combination―and multinomial models cannot be estimated when certain categories do 
not have observations.  
Second, because policies are embedded in countries the number of ‘true’ observations 
in a statistical sense is far closer to five than to 170 (5 countries times 34 policies) which 
makes the likelihood that one finds statistical significant results rather low. Furthermore, 
a low number of cases will give rise to estimation difficulties due to multicollinearity 
between the independent variables. For these reasons, the four–tier countries are included 
in the three–tier country database by taking the data for the most authoritative 
intermediate tier while disregarding data of the less authoritative intermediate tier. The 
results appear to be robust when data for the less authoritative tier is included. 
 
Selection bias 
The policies examined in the surveys are not randomly selected. They are policies where 
it is conceivable that subnational tiers may play a role. This is why the dataset does not 
contain policies that tend to be exclusively provided by the national tier, for example 
defense, foreign relations and justice. Hence one should be aware of a potential selection 
bias in the data, though it has to be said that a large number of selected policies involve 
the national government as policy provider: 42 percent of combinations in three–tier 
countries, and 75 percent in two–tier countries (see table B1). If there is a selection bias it 
is not likely to be severe.   
 
Table B1. Frequency of policy provision by government tiers in three– and two–tier 
countries 
  Three–tier countries  Two–tier countries 
Policy provision by the  Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
National tier only  60  7.0  114  24.9 
Regional tier only  55  6.5  –  – 
Local tier only  239  28.0  110  24.0 
National+Regional tier  39  4.6  –  – 
National+Local tier  84  9.9  234  51.1 
Regional+Local tier  199  23.3  –  – 
National+Regional+Local tier  177  20.8  –  – 
Total 853  100%  458  100% 
Notes: The frequency data refer to country*policies. Policy provision is measured for 34 policies in 26 
three–tier and 14 two–tier countries and refers to one year between 1996–2001.  
  42Validation 
The country data are new in its kind. To my knowledge, there does not exist another 
quantifiable and broadly comparative list of policies provided by governmental tiers. 
Thorlakson (2003, 6–11) develops a numerical index of federal jurisdiction for six 
federations; it measures the proportion of policy areas of exclusive state jurisdiction 
compared to areas of concurrent, shared and exclusive federal jurisdiction. Alesina, 
Angeloni and Schuknecht (2005, 279) measure the policy involvement of the European 
Union―but not the member states―by counting “the number of legal, judiciary and 
other, non–binding acts emanating from the European Union”. Most often, scholars use 
subnational expenditure data as a proxy for subnational policy involvement―despite the 
caveats associated with these indicators (see Schakel 2008b). In order to gauge the 
validity of the dependent variable I compare the dependent variable with subnational 
expenditure data. To this purpose I need to re–operationalize the country data. I follow 
the approach taken by Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2005) and count the number of 
policies for which the national tier is responsible (i.e. N, NR, NL and NRL). 
Subsequently, I calculate the proportion of policies for which the national tier is involved 
out of the total number of policies. Figure B1 plots this measure against the percentage of 
subnational expenditure out of total government expenditure.  
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Figure B1. National tier involvement in the provision of 34 policies (in percentage) 
plotted against the percentage subnational expenditure out of total government 
expenditure (average for 1995–2000) for 31 countries 
 
Notes: ALB = Albania; AUT = Austria; AZE = Azerbaijan; BEL = Belgium; BGR = Bulgaria; BLR = 
Belarus; CHE = Switzerland; CZE = Czech Republic; DNK = Denmark; ESP = Spain; EST = Estonia; FIN 
= Finland; FRA = France; HRV = Croatia; HUN = Hungary; ISL = Iceland; KAZ = Kazakhstan; LTU = 
Lithuania; LVA = Latvia; LUX = Luxembourg; MDA = Moldova; NLD = the Netherlands; NOR = 
Norway; POL = Poland; PRT = Portugal; ROM = Romania; RUS = Russian federation; SVK = Slovakia; 
SVN = Slovenia; SWE = Sweden; UKR = Ukraine. 
Source: World Bank (2006) 
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As expected, national tier involvement in policies is negatively correlated with 
subnational expenditure (Pearson r: –0.50, p < 0.01, N = 31). Belgium is a clear outlier. 
This can be explained by a difference in timing of the policy decentralization and fiscal 
decentralization. The constitutional revision of 1993, which devolved competencies to the 
regions and communities, came into effect in 1995 but fiscal arrangements were only 
significantly revised in favor of regions and communities in 2001 (Swenden 2006). The 
measure for policy provision dates from 1997 and so falls between the two reforms. If 
Belgium is excluded the Pearson correlation is: –0.67 (p < 0.01, N = 30). Appendix C 
Descriptive Tables 
 
Table C1. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables for the three–tier and two–tier country dataset 
Independent Variables  Three–tier countries  Two–tier countries 
 Mean  Std.  deviation Min – Max  Mean Std.  deviation Min – Max 
Probability National tier  0.135  0.107  0.01 – 0.61  0.187  0.115  0.01 – 0.61 
Probability Regional tier  0.239  0.095  0.01 – 0.53  –  –  – 
Probability Local tier  0.251  0.145  0.02 – 0.53  0.251  0.151  0.03 – 0.53 
Ceiling effect  0.057  0.113  0.00 – 0.81  0.198  0.230  0.00 – 0.93 
Multilevel  72.50  11.55  47 – 101  72.82  11.21  47 – 101 
Ethnic fragmentation  0.335 0.202 0.047  –  0.681  0.261  0.152  0.03 – 0.535 
Strength ethnic/regional party  3.250  8.111  0.00 – 40.48  3.454  6.079  0.00 – 20.00 
Democratic openness  27.483  10.818  0.19 – 42.03  29.746  9.345  6.87 – 43.62 
Polyarchy  5.661  6.298  –9 – 10  7.633  4.009  –7 – 10 
Economic welfare  9.174  0.815  7.659 – 10.177  9.225  0.696  8.055 – 10.514 
EU–membership  0.239  0.425  0 – 1  0.146  0.354  0 – 1 
EU–subsidies  0.062  0.220  0.00 – 1.078  0.111  0.382  0.00 – 1.480 
Notes: data refer to 853 country*policies (26 countries) for three–tier countries and to 458 country*policies (14 countries) for two–tier 
countries. 
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Table C2. Pearson correlations between the independent variables for the three–tier and two–tier country dataset 
  Independent  Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
1  Probability National tier  – –  –0.36*  0.34*  –0.05  0.08 –0.04 0.03 0.20*  0.22* 0.00 –0.15 
2  Probability Regional tier  –0.23* –  –  –  – –  –  –  –  – –  – 
3  Probability Local tier  –0.49* –0.09*  –  –0.38*  0.02  –0.00 –0.01 –0.04 –0.05  –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 
4 Ceiling  effect  0.25* –0.21*  –0.25*  –  –0.05  –0.08 –0.16* 0.14* 0.29* 0.28* 0.10* –0.23* 
5 Multilevel  0.28* 0.08*  –0.54*  0.11*  –  –0.01 0.01  0.03 0.03 0.02 –0.00  –0.00 
6 Ethnic  fragmentation  0.07 –0.13* 0.01  0.10* –0.00  – 0.57*  –0.15*  –0.09  0.09* –0.24* –0.40* 
7  Strength of ethnoregional parties  –0.02 –0.07*  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.40*  –  –0.01  0.03  –0.00 –0.24* –0.17* 
8 Democratic  openness  0.02  –0.03 –0.01 –0.03 –0.00  –0.39* 0.11*  –  0.80* 0.53*  0.06  0.00 
9 Polyarchy  0.04 0.08*  –0.01  0.11*  –0.00  –0.47* –0.11*  0.78*  –  0.43* 0.24* 0.17* 
10 Economic  welfare  –0.05 0.04 –0.01  –0.08  –0.01  –0.42* –0.25*  0.59*  0.56* – 0.29*  0.13* 
11 EU–membership  –0.06 –0.06 –0.01 –0.18*  –0.01  –0.19* 0.01  0.53* 0.37* 0.50*  –  0.70* 
12 EU–subsidies  –0.04 0.02 –0.00  –0.14*  –0.00  –0.21* –0.03  0.24* 0.19* 0.15* 0.38*  – 
Notes: Pearson correlations for the three–tier country dataset (N = 853) are shown below the diagonal and the Pearson correlations for 
the two–tier country dataset (N = 453) are shown above the diagonal. 
* p < 0.05 
 